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VILLIERS-FOSSARD
First Action
26 June, 1944, was rainy in Normandy. The 3rd Armored Division
had already come through the milling activity of Omaha Beach.
Vehicles were de-water-proofed, and men and machines were made
ready in the crowded assembly areas.
Activity was at a feverish pitch. Combat Command "A"
was ordered to move by infiltration to the zone of the 29th Infantry
Division, prepared to repel enemy counter-attacks in that zone.
The reorganization of the tank regiments was in progress. This
reorganization removed the light battalions as entities, and
resulted in the formation of three like battalions of two medium
companies and one light company each.
The composition of Battalions in the two Armored Regiments
is shown in the following table:
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32nd ARMD REGT
1st BATTALION
A Co (Light Tanks)
D Co (Medium Tanks)
G Co (Medium Tanks)
2nd BATTALION
B Co (Light Tanks)
E Co (Medium Tanks)
F Co (Medium Tanks)
3rd BATTALION
C Co (Light Tanks)
H Co (Medium Tanks)
I Co (Medium Tanks)
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33rd ARMD REGT
1st BATTALION
A Co (Light Tanks)
F Co (Medium Tanks)
I Co (Medium Tanks)
2nd BATTALION
B Co (Light Tanks)
D Co (Medium Tanks)
E Co (Medium Tanks)
3rd BATTALION
C Co (Light Tanks)
G Co (Medium Tanks)
H Co (Medium Tanks)
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The following three days were spent in further preparation.
Division Artillery fired some missions under Corps control. Combat
Command "A", in the zone of the 29th Infantry Division,
prepared for its first action.
On 29 June there existed an enemy salient in the zone of the
29th Division. This salient was some three thousands yards deep
and protected the town of VILLIERS-FOSSARD just east of the Vire
River. The mission given Combat Command "A" was to
reduce this salient, seize and hold VILLIERS-FOSSARD until relieved
by the 29th Division. The troop list for this operation was:
HQ Co, COMBAT COMMAND A -
BRIGADIER GENERAL DOYLE O. HICKEY, COMDG.
TFX - COL. T. E. BOUDINOT
3rd Bn, 32nd Armd Regt
3rd Bn, 36th Armd Inf Regt
A Co, 703rd Tank Destroyer Bn
C Co, 23rd Armd Engr Bn (- 1 Sqd.)
5 Tank Dozers
TFY - COL PARKS
2nd Bn, 32nd Armd Regt
2nd Bn, 36th Armd Inf Regt
B Co, 703rd Tank Destroyer Bn
A Co, 23rd Armd Engr Bn (- 1 Sqd.)
5 Tank Dozers
TFZ - LT COL ABNEY
1st Bn. 32nd Armd Regt
1st Bn. 36th Armd Inf Regt
703rd Tank Destroyer Bn (-2 Co's)
Rcn Co, 32nd Armd Regt
2 Sqds Engrs
1 Angle Dozer
C COMD. TRAINS - LT COL BROWN
Service Co, 32nd Armd Regt
Maint Co, 32nd Armd Regt
Service Co, 36th Armd Inf Regt
Co A, Maint Bn, 3rd Armd Div.
Co A, 45th Armd Med Bn
DIV ARTY - (COL BROWN)
54th Armd FA Bn, Direct Support TFY
54th Armd FA Bn, Direct Support TFX
391st Armd FA Bn, General Support
967th FA Bn, General Support
Defending this salient in the sector where Combat Command
"A" attacked, was a strongly reinforced Fusilier Battalion
of the 353rd Infantry Division. Their position was well prepared
and supported by a normal artillery compliment and anti-tank
weapons. Their defensive pattern took full advantage of the small
hedge-bound fields and a little stream that ran just north of
VILLIERS-FOSSARD. It was known that tanks could not negotiate
the thickly built-up hedge rows until Tank Dozers (ordinary tanks
to which bulldozer blades were attached) cleared a passage way,
so each Task Force in the assault was given some of these improvised
weapons.
At 0900 on 29 June, the attack was launched with two Task
Forces abreast and one in reserve. Task Force X attacked on the
left, and Task Force Y, on the right. Following the artillery
preparation, there was a short, rapid advance. Task Force X reached
La Forge-Bois de BRETEL at 1130 and was ordered to remain there.
The tank and infantry teams of Task Force Y advanced slowly against
the enemy's well dug-in positions, and reached the little stream
north of VILLIERS-FOSSARD. The next day the attack was resumed.
Both Task Forces pressed forward to the objective, where they
stabilized and secured the position until they were relieved
by elements of the 29th Division.
Troops of the 3rd Armored learned much in this, their first combat.
It was a simple, straightforward action, but it showed the tankers
and infantrymen alike, how their enemy could fight, even when
faced by overpowering odds. They learned what it was to face
the withering small-arms fire and to advance through mortar and
artillery barrage. They learned that the well concealed German
bazooka and panzerfaust teams were as dangerous to a medium tank
as a high velocity anti-tank gun. And they learned that tanks
and infantry together can fight in almost any type of terrain
even the Bocage hedge rows. The losses were relatively high:
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TANKS
OTHER VEHICLES
OFFICERS
ENLISTED MEN |
31
12
18
333 |
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However, there is no doubt but the lessons learned saved many
lives in the sensational drives that these men were soon to make.
THE BUILD UP
There were no further combat operations until 9 July. The
3rd Armored Division was at that time in the zone of the 30th
Division. They had crossed the Vire River at AIREL under heavy
enemy artillery fire and occupied a shallow bridgehead held by
the 30th Division. When the occupation of this bridgehead was
completed, Combat Command "B" was attached to the 30th
Division and ordered to attack south toward ST. GILLES. Combat
Command "A" was ordered to protect the right flank
of XIX Corps and to attack in the direction of LES LENDES and
LE PERRY. Combat Command "A" made some slow progress
toward its objective, and, on 10 July, was attached to the 9th
Infantry Division of the VII Corps. On 11 July, Combat Command
"A" was moved to the vicinity of ST. JEAN de DAYE to
counter an enemy tank threat. Here the tank companies were parceled
out to infantry regiments, and, in conjunction with elements
of the 9th Division, CCA fought a stiff and successful defensive
action against some choice elements of the Wehrmacht, principally
paratroops strongly supported by tanks.
Combat Command "B" during this period was engaged in
the battle of HILL 91, or HAUT VENTS. A task force commanded
by Colonel DORRANCE ROYSDON, took HILL 91 on 10 July with a badly
depleted force. On 11 July they were driven off, and then proceeded
to retake the hill and hold it in the face of very heavy resistance
by the enemy. The hill got hotter and hotter. Numerous counter-attacks
were thrown at Colonel ROYSDON's force. Relieving elements from
the 30th Division finally reached and relieved him at 1430 on
16 July.
During this period Combat Command "B" had contributed
largely to the defeat of an abortive attempt by the Panzer Lehr
Division to take ISIGNY. The Panzer Lehr was fresh; it bad excellent
new equipment; but it took a terrific beating at HAUT VENTS,
FONT HEBERT and BELLE LANDE.
Our losses from 9 to 15 July (inclusive):
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TANKS
ARTILLERY
OTHER VEHICLES
OFFICERS
ENLISTED MEN |
52
1
52
30
425 |
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On 16 July both Combat Commands reverted to Division control,
and the Division assembled just west of ST. JEAN DE DAYE on 17
July. The 3rd Armored Division was now in VII Corps.
It was during this period that the fast spreading gas alarm came.
Early on the evening of 21 July the first alarm was sounded,
based on information that passed like the wind from unit to adjacent
unit. On the following day, again in the evening, there were
four more such alarms causing a widespread scrambling for masks.
All of these alarms proved false. They were based on smells and
sights that the troops soon learned to identify as normal battlefield
occurrences. None of the rumors were originated in the units
of the 3rd Armored Division, but they spread there as elsewhere.
The rest period was also disturbed by a noticeable increase in
Luftwaffe activity. The enemy planes usually came just as the
last squadrons of P-47's and P-38's left the area. They dropped
flares and bombed in widely scattered areas and not in any very
great strength; usually two and three plane elements operated
together. Division Trains suffered a few casualties on the night
of 23 July from bombing and strafing. Other elements of the division
suffered light casualties from enemy air action during the same
period.
From 18 to 25 July the Division refitted. On the 25th its strength
was about:
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TANKS
ARTILLERY
OTHER VEHICLES
OFFICERS
ENLISTED MEN |
96.5%
100%
100%
97.7%
99.8% |
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THE ST. LO BREAKTHROUGH
The SAINT LO breakthrough was all set and waited only on the
weather. The period 22-24 July was one of almost continual rain.
On the morning of 26 July the weather broke, and the greatest
air show of the war prepared the way for the breakthrough out
of Normandy.
The breakthrough was to be in the zone of VII Corps. A rectangular
area about three miles by five miles between MARIGNY and ST.
GILLES (see sketch No 2) was the target of the" saturation
bombardment by elements of both the 8th and 9th Air Forces.
The 9th Infantry Division, on the west, was to attack through
this saturated area and seize and hold the right flank of the
penetration. The 30th Infantry Division, on the east, was to
attack south, seize and hold the line CERENCES, TESSY SUR VIRE,
SAINT LO. The 4th Infantry Division was to seize the high ground
in the vicinity of and east of CERISY LA SALLE.
The 1st Infantry Division (Combat Command "B", 3rd
Armored Division attached) was then to move through the sector
of the 9th Division, turn west near LE SAULT and secure the COUTANCES
area, thereby extending the line of the 9th Division, and cutting
off the enemy facing the VIII Corps on the west.
The 3rd Armored Division (less Combat Command B) would then move
rapidly through the 4th Division, seize the south exits of COUTANCES
and secure the south flank of the 1st Division between HYMOUVILLE
and CERISY LA SALLE.
The 2nd Armored Division, further to the east, was to move through
the sector of the 30th Division, push south and then west and
secure the line CERENCES - ST. DENIS LE GAST.
The attack moved successfully. On 26 July Combat Command "B",
attached to the 1st Division, had fought its way to a position
just west of MARIGNY. Continuing the attack to the west the next
day, elements of Combat Command "B" reached MONTHUCHON.
Then, on 28 July, they were in sight of COUTANCES. They did not
get into the city, but were ordered to turn back east and assist
the 1st Division in reducing an enemy strong point near COMPROND.
On 25 and 26 July, the 3rd Armored (less Combat Command "B")
remained in assembly areas west of St. JEAN DE DAYE. Then, on
27 July, they attacked south at 0630. Initially the road craters
caused by the saturation bombing and a bypassed enemy pocket
south of MARIGNY slowed the advance. This enemy strong point
near ST. BENOIT, estimated at one infantry battalion, was later
bypassed, and the Combat Command reached LE SAULT.
The next day Combat Command "A" turned southwest toward
MONTPINCHON, one of the Division's objectives. There was moderate
enemy resistance all day, principally infantry, but anti-tank
fire was encountered and scattered groups of tanks were met.
By night, Combat Command "A" had forces in position
to attack the enemy-held MONTPINCHON from the northeast and southeast.
On 29 July, German columns were moving south on all possible
roads. One column with many armored vehicles tried to use a secondary
road through MONTPINCHON and RONCEY. Near ST. DENIS LE GAST the
2nd Armored Division had effectively blocked this road. About
fifty German tanks (probably part of the column trying to escape
to the south) were in the vicinity of MONTPINCHON. These tanks
added greatly to the ·strength of the already strong position
at MONTPINCHON. Combat Command "A" was ordered to bypass
the strongpoint to the north and south. Meanwhile, the supporting
groups of fighter bombers were becoming cognizant of the situation
around RONCEY where enemy vehicles were in double columns and
bumper to bumper, and MONTPINCHON, where the defenders were virtually
surrounded. In this area the Air Corps got in one of its most
telling blows. All friendly vehicles were notified to keep their
identification markings prominently displayed while the P-47's
worked from ST. DENIS LE GAST to MONTPINCHON. When the bombing
and strafing were finished, a single battle group from Combat
Command "A" tended to mopping up MONTPINCHON. Another
battle group was sent through RONCEY. Roads and streets had to
be cleared with bulldozers. During the remainder of the afternoon
and night the SOULLE River was bridged, and Combat Command "A"
reached BELVAL.
Combat Command "B" reverted to Division control and
moved from COMPROND to LA VILLEDERIE.
On the 30th July Combat Command "A" was attached to
the 1st Division and Combat Command "B" to the 4th
Division.
COMPOSITION:
COMBAT COMMAND "A" (BRIG GEN HICKEY)
32nd Armd Regt
3rd Bn, 36th Armd Inf Regt
2nd Bn, 26th Inf Regt (1st Div)
Co A, 703rd TD Bn
Co A & C, 23rd Armd Engr Bn
54th Armd FA Bn
67th Armd FA Bn
Co A, 413th AAA Bn
Btrys B & C, 486th AAA Bn
Co A, Maint Bn, 3rd A. D.
Co A, 45th Armd Med Bn
COMBAT COMMAND "B" (COL BOUDINOT)
33rd Armd Regt
36th Armd Inf Regt (- 3rd Bn)
83rd Armd Rcn Bn
Co B & C, 703rd TD Bn
Co B & D, 23rd Armd Engr Bn
391st Armd FA Bn
58th Armd FA Bn
Co B, 413th AAA Bn
Btrys A & D, 486th AAA Bn
Co C, 45th Armd Med Bn
Co C, Maint Bn, 3rd A. D.
When this attachment became effective, Combat Command "A"
had moved south through the still cluttered RONCEY area and established
a bridgehead across the SIENE River. In this crossing operation,
Lt. Col. Doan, commanding Task Force X, personally led his infantry
across the river when they were stopped by heavy enemy fire from
the opposite bank. His action earned him the Distinguished Service
Cross. Combat Command "B" had advanced south, and elements
had forded the river at LA SAYERIE and reached position on the
Division objective west of VILLEDIEU-LES-POELES. A bridge was
under construction.
The next objective for Combat Command "A" was MORTAIN..
The See River had to be crossed. This was accomplished just south
of BRECEY on 1 August. Then they were in the enemy's rear areas
and moving fast. It was a job well suited to the employment of
armor. German service troops as well as combat elements were
completely surprised, and the tanks had a brief field day. Severe
actions occurred at JUVIGNY LE TERTRE and REFUVIEILLE where the
Germans managed to organize very well. MORTAIN was reached on
2 August. For two hard-fought days the enemy attempted to retake
the high ground around JUVIGNY, but Combat Command "A"
held its gains.
Combat Command "B", meanwhile, had bypassed VILLEDIEU-LES-POELES
and moved toward SAINT POIS. At this time they were given the
new objective of CHERENCE-LE-ROUSSEL. The next day, 5 August,
the Combat Command was attached to the 1st Division and ordered
to make a bridgehead over the SEE river in the vicinity of CHERENCE-LE-ROUSSEL.
This mission was accomplished, and Combat Command "B"
held the bridgehead until relieved by elements of the 30th Division
on 6 August.
On 5 August, Combat Command "A" was ordered to move
deeper into enemy territory. The objective was AMBRIERES LE GRAND
on the MAYENNE River, and the route ran through BUAIS and LE
TEILLEUL. Scattered opposition was met, but the Combat Command
reached its objective on 6 August. One Battle Group was sent
to BARENTON, where it was attached to the 2nd Armored Division
and remained in that status until 12 August. Strong patrols went
Into DOMFRONT and LASSAY.
BATTLES OF MORTAIN
The 30th Infantry Division relieved the 1st Infantry Division
at MORTAIN, and almost immediately found itself in dead serious
trouble. The enemy had massed his forces, principally armor,
and launched an all out effort to the west. His intentions were
to seize AVRANCHES and cut off the allied forces to the south
thereof completely from their supplies. The main weight of this
attack fell on the 30th Division in the vicinity of MORTAIN.
At 0245 on 7 August the counter attack first struck in force.
The 120th Infantry Regiment of the 30th Division was driven out
of MORTAIN, and before morning the attack had carried to LE MESNIL
TOVE. A complete battalion was cut off on a hill east of MORTAIN.
Combat Command "B" of the 3rd Armored Division had
been fighting continuously for 12 days and was just closing into
what was to be a rest and maintenance area in the vicinity of
REFUVIEILLE, when word of the German counter-attack was received.
At 0730 on 7 August, Combat Command "B" was attached
to the 30th Infantry Division, and at 1050 orders were received
to send out strong reconnaissance forces to LE MESNIL ADELEE
and CUVES.
The Combat Command was divided into four Task Forces for this
operation:
TASK FORCE 1 - COL ROYSDON
1st Bn, 33rd Armd Regt
1st Bn, 36th Armd Inf Regt
Rcn Co, 33rd Armd Regt
1 Pl. Co C, 703rd TD Bn
1 Pl. Co B, 23rd Armd Engr Bn
Med, Maint Detachments
TASK FORCE 2 - COLONEL CORNOG
2nd Bn, 33rd Armd Regt
2nd Bn, 36th Armd Inf Regt
Co A, 83rd Armd Rcn Bn
1st Pl., Co B, 703rd TD Bn
2nd Pl., Co C, 703rd TD Bn
2nd Pl., Co B, 23rd Armd Engr Bn
Med, Maint Detachments
TASK FORCE 3 - LT COL HOGAN
3rd Bn, 33rd Armd Regt
2nd Bn, 119th Inf (atchd)
Co B, 83rd Armd Rcn Bn
3rd Pl., Co "C", 703rd TD Bn
3rd Pl., Co "B", 23rd Armd Engr Bn
Med, Maint Detachments
TASK FORCE CABANISS - LT COL CABANISS
83rd Armd Rcn Bn (- Cos A & B)
Co B, 703rd TD Bn (- 1st Pl.)
Co D, 23rd Armd Engi Bn
Co C, 703rd TD Bn (- 3 Pls)
Co B, 23rd Armd Engr Bn (- 3 Pls)
Co B, 45th Armd Med Bn
Co C, Maint Bn, 3rd A. D.
Det Co E, 23rd Armd Engr Bn
ARTILLERY GROUPMENT - LT COL GARTON
391st Armd FA Bn
87th Armd FA Bn
Btrys A & D, 486th AAA Bn
By 1610 on 7 August the leading elements of Task Force 1 had
reached a point east of LE MESNIL ADELEE, and, since the Infantry
following did not come up, Task Force 1 was forced to dig in
and establish all-around defenses for the night. In the meantime,
Task Force 2, meeting light resistance on its reconnaissance
mission towards CUVES, was pulled back and ordered to launch
an attack towards JUVIGNY LE TERTRE. Almost immediately this
Task Force ran into very poor tank terrain and very heavy enemy
resistance.
On 8 August Task Force 1 moved via LE MESNIL ADELEE to take LE
MESNIL TOVE. Task Force 1 was attached to the 119th Regimental
Combat Team and led the attack on LE MESNIL TOVE. Fierce fighting
followed, and losses on both sides were heavy. In general, the
mission was to seize and secure LE MESNIL TOVE and to establish
a contact with the 8th Infantry Regiment which was pushing down
from the north.
The enemy was employing crack armored troops in an effort to
cut our forces by a drive along the CHERENCE - LE ROUSSEL - LE
MESNIL ADELEE - AVRANCHES corridor. Throughout the day heavy
fighting took place. Terrain was very difficult for employment
of armor, but tanks continued to do battle where infantry might
have fared better. Twice during the day the force suffered loss
of ground, but by nightfall contact had been made with the 8th
Regimental Combat Team at CHERENCE LE ROUSSEL. In the meantime,
Task Force 3 was moved to LE MENTS and placed on an alert to
go to the aid of either Task Force 1 or Task Force 2. The 83rd
Armored Reconnaissance Battalion outposted the Combat Command
area to the south and east.
Throughout the day and night of 9 August, Task Force 1, placed
well in front of the remainder of the 119th Combat Team, to which
this Task Force was attached, continued to hold its ground at
LE MESNIL TOVE, but was sustaining very heavy casualties.
At daybreak Task Force 2 launched an attack via JUVIGNY LE TERRE
to establish a roadblock east thereof. By early afternoon, the
mission was accomplished. The right flank of the 119th was contacted
and Task Force 2 was also placed under control of the 119th Combat
Team. The south side of the German counter-attack was now shored
up, and Task Force 3 of Combat Command "B", with a
battalion of the 119th Infantry Regiment attached, was ordered
to attack to the east through the zone of the 120th Infantry
Regiment and then towards the north to seize the Road Junction
238 just north of MORTAIN. By 1400, the force was rolling against
light resistance and continued until the turn north was made.
At this point, they met the enemy in strength, defending with
artillery, anti-tank guns, tanks and bazookas. The Task Force
Commander out-maneuvered the enemy tanks encountered and bypassed
much of the resistance, but although only one hundred yards from
the objective by late evening, the bitter resistance of the enemy
forced the Task Force to go into a defensive leaguer for the
night. They were ordered to hold at all costs until relieved
by the 12th Regimental Combat Team.
For the next two days and nights, fierce fighting went on continuously.
The Task Force was cut off on all sides for a greater part of
this time and the relief unit was unable to make contact. Counter-attack
after counter-attack was launched by the enemy, but the Task
Force held its ground against superior forces. It can be readily
seen that these battles played a major part in disrupting the
whole German counter-attack. By sealing off the advance to the
west, Task Forces 1 and 2 played decisive parts.
When the enemy elected to drive to the south, he threatened to
cut off MORTAIN and the vital supply links of the First U. S.
Army, which, by this time, had driven far to the south and to
the east of MORTAIN and was rolling towards Paris. Here Task
Force 3 played a major part. The enemy did everything in his
power to keep open the gap between Task Force 3 and the supporting
elements to the west and to keep open the road leading through
MORTAIN. Task Force 3 held its ground in spite of severe infantry
losses and the loss of 23 of its tanks. By 12 August, the German
counter-attack had spent itself.
The Air Corps had paralyzed his supply columns and chopped reinforcement
troops to pieces.
When the withdrawal of the German forces began, the offensive
had not gained the momentum that the Germans had hoped for. The
116th Panzer Division was the principal attacking unit, and it
was cut to pieces, losing one-third to one-half of its effective
strength. On the north of the 116th, the 85th German Infantry
Division, already battered, suffered further. And to the south,
remnants of the 2nd and 17th SS Divisions took their share of
the drubbing. The attack was never properly coordinated, and
consequently gained little for its severe losses.
On the 7 August Major General (then Brigadier General) Maurice
Rose took command of the 3rd Armored Division. By 12 August,
all units were again under division control. The strength of
the division was approximately:
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TANKS
ARTILLERY
OTHER VEHICLES
OFFICERS
ENLISTED MEN |
93.5%
100%
99.0%
91.3%
96.4% |
|
Again supply and replacements had worked miracles to achieve
a comeback. The value of combat experience gained could not be
measured.
THE FALAISE GAP
On 12 August the Division moved into new assembly areas west
of MAYENNE and prepared to attack to the northeast on the following
day.
The British, driving south from CAEN, and the American First
Army, pushing eastward, had created a potential trap around a
considerable portion of Field Marshal Von Kluge's Seventh Army.
The escape gap of this trap later became defined between FALAISE
and ARGENTAN. The 3rd Armored Division was going to be in at
the kill.
Division Field Order Number 6 fixed the Division axis of advance:
MAYENNE - PRE EN PAIL - CARROUGES - PANES. At 0530 on the morning
of 13 August the 83rd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion crossed
the line of departure and the Division was moving toward RANES
- FROMENTEL and to some of the bitterest fighting of the war.
The objective was the high ground around RANES.
Combat Command "A", following the reconnaissance
screen, led the Division attack in two parallel columns. Task
Force X, commanded by Lt. Colonel Doan, was on the right and
Task Force Y, commanded by Lt Colonel Richardson, was on the
left. Elements of the 728th German Infantry Regiment were encountered
in JAVRON and COUPTRAIN. Anti-tank and machine gun fire was encountered
at other points, but by 2030 hours elements of Task Force X were
at RANES.
Task Force Y had finally bypassed the strong enemy position
near COUPTRAIN, and, at the end of the day, had covered about
one-third of the distance from COUPTRAIN to RANES. Task Force
1 of Combat Command "B" in conjunction with part of
Division Reserve was in contact with the enemy in some strength
just north and east of COUPTRAIN. The remainder of the Division
was in and around PRE EN PAIL. The 60th Infantry Regiment was
attached to the 3rd Armored Division for this operation. It was
in Division Reserve.
The area between PRE EN PAIL and RANES became a battle area.
There were no particular front lines, and contact was everywhere.
The road from CARROUGES to RANES was littered with both German
and American tanks and other equipment destroyed in the running
fight.
On 14 August, Task Force X attempted to extend their position
to the north but were unsuccessful. Elements of the 1st and 9th
SS Divisions made strong counter-attacks from both the north
and south. All were repulsed. Task Force Y attempted to join
Task Force X at RANES. They met strong resistance at JOUE DU
BOIS. When they couldn't overcome this resistance, they bypassed
it to the east and got about halfway between JOUE DU BOIS and
RANES by dark.
The 3rd Battalion, 33rd Armored Regiment, was ordered to move
on a route further to the east and reinforce Task Force X in
RANES. This battalion encountered some resistance, but reached
RANES at 1800 hours.
JOUE DU BOIS was assigned as an objective for Division Reserve.
Operation against this town was not completed until elements
of the 9th Infantry Division relieved elements of the 3rd Armored
Division.
Combat Command "B" seized LA MOTTE FOUQUET. Elements
of the Division during the day took about 1300 prisoners and
destroyed 16 enemy tanks. Supporting dive bombers destroyed many
other tanks and vehicles.
CLASHES AT FROMENTEL
On 15 August fighting continued to be heavy. At the close
of the day, the entire Division was in a tight position around
RANES. The attack of Combat Command "A" toward FROMENTEL
had not progressed much beyond the outskirts of RANES, but 500
more prisoners were taken.
The next morning, 16 August, the 3rd Armored launched a coordinated
attack toward FROMENTEL. Combat Command "A" met tank
resistance and heavily defended roadblocks, causing their attack
to move slowly. At about 1230, the covering shell cracked a little,
and the Combat Command advanced rapidly to LA NOGUERIE. Then
at 1500, the Germans launched a counterattack in some strength.
This caused Combat Command "A" to withdraw about a
thousand yards. At 1630 the advance continued and by 2200 there
was fighting on the outskirts of FROMENTEL.
Combat Command "B" followed a route generally to the
west of Combat Command "A". They met heavy resistance
all the way. By dark Task Force 1 had reached LES YVETEAUX just
southwest of FROMENTEL and Task Force 2 leaguered a little to
the southeast of Task Force 1. Fifteen enemy tanks were destroyed
and 400 more prisoners were taken.
During the day of 17 August, Combat Command "A"
fought its way into FROMENTEL from the east. Task Force 1 of
Combat Command "B" attempted to launch an attack on
FROMENTEL from the southwest in conjunction with Combat Command
"A"'s attack, but such heavy resistance was met that
the town itself was not reached. At about 1700 when all but the
western part of the town had been cleared of the enemy, flights
of P-38s heavily bombed FROMENTEL. Combat Command "A"
was forced to withdraw, and small forces of Germans reoccupied
the center and western parts of the town. At 1900 hours Company
C of the 32nd Armored Regiment was sent into FROMENTEL and the
friendly planes made the same mistake again. This time the eastern
part of the town was retained by Combat Command "A".
Task Force 2 (Lt Col. King), the other half of Combat Command
"B", attacked to seize the high ground at LA PIERRE
HUREL-MESNIL JEAN. This Task Force fought stubborn resistance
all day. At about 1600 hours they got across the railroad east
of FROMENTEL, seized HILL 216 south of PUTANGES, and leaguered
for the night just south of their objective.
Task Force "Hogan" from Division Reserve, in conjunction
with elements of the 83rd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, protected
the Division right flank by seizing the road junction west of
ECOUCHE. During the day, as for days previously, the German Army
streamed south and east between FALAISE and ARGENTAN. About twelve
hundred enemy vehicles passed the front of the 3rd Armored Division
that day, receiving artillery fire and attack from the air all
the way.
A coordinated attack by Combat Command "B" gained the
objective at PUTANGES at 1210, and at 1237 on 18 August, Sergeant
Donald Ekdahl of the 33rd Armored Regiment met advance elements
of British armor on the road near PUTANGES. Other such meetings
occurred to our right and left. The so-called FALAISE gap was
closed. The operation was more accurately described as a "squeeze-play",
since the enemy, by fanatical and skillful rear-guard action,
succeeded in keeping his escape routes open until the major portion
of his forces were extricated from the potential trap.
Combat Command "A" completed mopping up in FROMENTEL.
Combat Command "B" held its objective, the high ground
south of PUTANGES.
Elements of Division Reserve mopped up the TREIZE SAINTS-BATILLY
area and Task Force "Hogan" remained on his objective.
The 60th Infantry Regiment was released at 0800 on 19 August.
The whole battle of RANES-FROMENTEL was close-in fighting with
a "Fluid Front." Tanks and tank destroyers had many
engagements at ranges less than one hundred yards. Elements of
the Division frequently found themselves engaged in stiff fights
on ground already passed over by other elements of the Division.
The enemy was everywhere, and frequently had no idea where American
troops were, hence many surprise engagements were fought.
During this operation, as in some later ones, the Reconnaissance
Battalion was busy establishing roadblocks on both flanks and
sometimes to the rear of the Division. They served also to maintain
communication between units by means of patrols.
Next Chapter: Seine to Siegfried
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